Lessons Learned from "Lexi Rose" Grounding and Capsize
Introduction and Background
The Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) released its report on February 27, 2025, detailing the tragic capsize of the creel fishing vessel Lexi Rose on September 21, 2023, off Melrose Point, Aberdeenshire, Scotland. This incident resulted in the death of the lone skipper, Sandy Alexander, aged 69, and serves as a critical case study for fishing safety, particularly for single-handed operations. Creel fishing, involving baited traps for catching fish in inshore waters, is a common practice in the UK, adding context to the operational risks involved.
Incident Details
The incident occurred at approximately 1109 under challenging conditions: a south-south-westerly Beaufort force 5 wind, slight seas, a long northerly swell of about 1.1 meters, an air temperature of 12°C, and a sea temperature of 13.1°C, with low tide at 1028 and negligible tidal stream. The Lexi Rose, a 7.29-meter aluminum vessel built in 1990 and powered by a 50 horsepower outboard engine, was operating single-handedly when it grounded and capsized in shallow water. The report indicates the outboard engine’s lower assembly unit likely struck a rock, detaching and causing an immediate loss of propulsion, leading to the vessel grounding and capsizing in a 1 to 1.5-meter swell.
Sandy Alexander went overboard, suffering a significant head injury, and drowned. His body was found near the wreckage, unconscious, with no evidence of self-rescue attempts. The investigation could not determine routine steps taken to manage grounding and capsize hazards, given the rapid unfolding of events.
Vessel and Skipper Profile
The Lexi Rose, registered as BF 370 under the UK flag, was designed for inshore fishing, with its shallow draught increasing exposure to grounding risks. Sandy Alexander, an experienced fisherman from Fraserburgh, Aberdeenshire, was known to occasionally wear a PFD but was not wearing one on the day of the accident. As a non-swimmer, his lack of PFD use was particularly critical, with the report noting this could have improved survival chances, especially given his unconscious state post-injury.
Analysis and Findings
The MAIB’s analysis, detailed in the report, provides a comprehensive breakdown of the incident:
|
Aspect |
Details |
|
Entry into Water and Injury |
Capsize mechanism unknown; skipper likely injured during capsize, found unconscious, no self-rescue identified. |
|
Hazard Control |
Single-handed operation increased exposure to grounding/capsize risks, similar to the Anna-Marie II case ( Capsize of fishing vessel Anna-Marie II). Limited time to mitigate due to environmental conditions and propulsion loss. |
|
Environmental Appraisal |
Skipper assessed weather (Beaufort force 5, 1m swell) and worked with nearby vessel Chance, but started creels before support, possibly caught by wave height fluctuations. |
|
Loss of Propulsion |
Occurred 4 minutes before engine stop, likely from striking an underwater obstacle, caused by vessel weight and swell, shearing lower assembly unit. |
|
Single-Handed Operation |
Limited reaction time (approx. 4 minutes to ground), used local VHF channel 12 instead of “Mayday” on channel 16, DSC radio not used, distracted by creel tasks, unable to anchor, don PFD, or raise formal distress. MCA guidance highlights risks. |
|
Personal Flotation Devices |
Skipper, a non-swimmer, occasionally wore PFD but not on accident day; events unfolded too quickly to don one, postmortem showed unconsciousness likely prevented airway maintenance, PFD could have improved survival. |
The conclusions emphasize that Alexander drowned from a head injury during the capsize, was unconscious before or after entering water, and underestimated hazards of single-handed inshore work, caught by swell and propulsion loss. The report notes VHF DSC was not used, likely due to panic and local channel use, with limited time preventing survival actions like anchoring, raising a “Mayday,” or donning a PFD.
Recommendations and Safety Measures
The MAIB report did not propose new recommendations for single-handed fishing, citing existing industry guidance as sufficient. However, it highlighted critical safety measures:
|
Source |
Recommendation Details |
|
MCA’s Fishermen’s Safety Guide |
Fishermen must wear a PFD or a safety harness if the risk of falling overboard cannot be mitigated. |
|
MCA’s Single Handed Fishing Guide |
Always wear your PFD and ensure it has enough buoyancy to turn you on your back, keeping your mouth clear of the water, even if unconscious. |
|
Seafish Potting Safety Industry Advisory Note |
|
|
MAIB Report 12/2020 (Anna-Marie II) |
Identifies fishing close to safe operation limits as a safety issue, URL: |
These guidelines emphasize the importance of PFD use, environmental assessment, and effective communication, such as using DSC radio for distress calls, to enhance safety in single-handed fishing operations.
Conclusion and Industry Implications
The capsize of Lexi Rose and the loss of Sandy Alexander underscore the inherent dangers of single-handed fishing, particularly in inshore waters with potential for rapid, uncontrollable emergencies. The incident highlights the critical need for wearing PFDs, especially for non-swimmers, and adhering to safety protocols like raising distress signals and assessing environmental conditions. The report’s reference to existing guidance suggests a need for continuous education and reinforcement within the fishing industry to prevent similar tragedies, ensuring the safety of those who rely on the sea for their livelihood.
An unexpected detail is the specific environmental conditions, including a Beaufort force 5 wind and a 1.1-meter swell, which, while not extreme, contributed to the rapid development of the emergency, highlighting the dangers even in seemingly manageable weather. This adds a layer of complexity to risk assessment for inshore fishing operations.
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